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Master's Thesis of International Studies
(International Cooperation)

Refugees and Official Development Assistance (ODA)

난민과 공적개발원조 (ODA)

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Graduate School of International Studies
Seoul National University
International Cooperation Major

Taehyuk Yoo

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Jeong, Hyeok

Submitting a master's thesis of International Studies

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Graduate School of International Studies
Seoul National University
International Cooperation Major

Taehyuk Yoo

Confirming the master's thesis written by
Taehyuk Yoo
August 2019

Chair	Kim, Chong-Sup	(Seal)
Vice Chair	Kim, Taekyoon	(Seal)
Examiner	Jeong, Hyeok	(Seal)

Abstract

The number of refugees and asylum seekers has reached an all-time high, unprecedented since WWII. Policies, including those of Official Development Assistance (ODA), have changed in an attempt to amend, deter, or evade this change. This thesis sets out to highlight the compositional changes in ODA with regards to refugees and asylum seekers, especially with regards to the in-donor refugee costs. This sector, which had been existent but rather stagnant before the so-called refugee crisis, has undergone immense changes. As this sector grew, so did the concerns of those who found it potentially harmful towards the development of other ODA sectors. Furthermore, some deny this sector's ODA eligibility, arguing that funneling funds into one's own country digresses from the fundamental understanding that ODA should promote the economic development and social well-being of developing countries. To elaborate on these issues, an examination of DAC members, as a whole, will be done. Afterwards, the top five European countries with the highest stock of refugees will be examined in detail to see if individual profiles coincide with the DAC average.

Keywords: asylum seekers, in-donor refugee costs, ODA, refugees

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Acronyms

CRS	Creditor Reporting System
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOJ	Department of Justice
EU	European Union
INS	Immigration and Naturalization Service
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USCIS	U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
WDI	World Development Indicators

Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1. The Convention and its Protocol

A discussion of asylum policies would not suffice without mentioning the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol[1]. The 1951 Convention defines "refugees" as those who are outside the boundaries of their country or nationality; has reason to fear prosecution based on their race, religion, nationality, or membership of a social group or political party; and cannot return to their country in fear of prosecution or a lack of protection. The Convention also states some of the basic rights that refugees are entitled to, though the they may be realized differently in practice. These rights not only include those regarding housing, education, work, but also and most importantly, the right not to be involuntarily returned to their country in cases where they may face serious threats to their lives or freedom (the principle of *non-refoulment*). Though the Convention and Protocol does stipulate the rights of refugees, there are many ways in which countries may curtail their refugee intake, such as tightening border controls through stringent visa requirements and security checks. Furthermore, a 'well-founded fear of prosecution' is also prone to interpretation.

The 1951 Convention, however, was limited to those who had become refugees due to events before 1 January 1951. Accepting that new refugee-circumstances had

[1] United Nations. (n.d.). The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.

occurred since 1951, members states agreed to include events that had happened after the original time limit and thus expanded the scope of the 1951 Convention.

To clarify a distinction in definitions, “Asylum Seekers” are those who have requested for sanctuary but has yet to receive “refugee status”. Though UNHCR states that they are often called “prima facie refugees”, asylum seekers are not guaranteed the full legal rights guaranteed to those who have been given refugee status.[2] Furthermore, these asylum seekers are different from “internally displaced persons (IDP)” who are people in similar situations to refugees but are still placed within the borders of their country or territory of nationality.

1.2. The Development of Asylum Policies

Asylum policies became heavily political in the aftermath of the political and economic collapse in Eastern Europe (such as Turkey, Iran, and Sri Lanka[3]) and the disintegration of the Soviet Union (Hatton & Tulip, 2008). In the 1980s, The EU-15, which saw a surge in asylum seekers pouring in from the areas mentioned previously, began to introduce policies and methods to control their refugee intake. For example, the UK, in 1987, began to implement sanctions against illegal immigrants (Baird, 2017). Private carriers transporting undocumented immigrants without the proper documentation were fined. France raised special airport zones, where deportation was made more probable through a pre-screening process.

[2] United Nations. "Asylum-Seekers." UNHCR.
[3] UNHCR. (2001) ‘Asylum Applications in Industrialized Countries: 1980-1999’

As a whole, the EU implemented greater visa restrictions through the Schengen Convention, originally formulated in 1984 by France and Germany[4]. The Convention, which aimed to promote free transportation within member states and greater security around its external borders, was implemented in 1990. Member States hoped to enhance cooperation between their immigration offices and create a system of uniform visas and database. By 1998 the Schengen countries had a coherent list of over 150 non-member states that were required visas upon entry into Member States' territory (Hatton & Tulip, 2008).

Moreover, the Dublin Convention, to "*assign responsibility* for processing an asylum application to a single member state" rather than to "ensure the *sharing* of responsibility", was signed in 1990 [5] (Radjenovic, 2019). The *authorization principle*[6], through a hierarchy of criteria, places the responsibility of processing asylum applications on a *single* Member State to prevent asylum seekers from 'asylum shopping', or utilizing the freedom of movement existent between Member States to ultimately request asylum in multiple countries. Overall, the first country of entry is the most decisive factor in determining a Member State's responsibility in processing asylum applications, but there are exceptions, including circumstances regarding family or cultural factors[7].

In 1992, after a ministerial meeting in London, additional resolutions to the Dublin Convention were created (Hatton & Tulip, 2008). One pertained to the 'safe

[4] The Schengen Agreement - History and the Definition. (n.d.)
[5] The Dublin convention, however, was not binding until 1997.
[6] Dublin Convention, article 3.2
[7] Dublin Convention, article 9

country' concept, which allowed countries to send back asylum seekers to their previous country of transit if that country could be deemed as a 'safe' country, i.e., a country in which an asylum application could have been submitted in the first place). Furthermore, if the asylum seeker's country of origin could be deemed to be a 'safe' country, asylum seekers could be sent back without violating the principle of non-refoulment. Lastly, there was the 'manifestly unfounded' concept, which allowed destination countries to expedite the refugee status determination process if refugees were subject to the 'safe' concepts mentioned previously or if they had a criminal record, including that of a forgery of application documents.

The Dublin Convention, however, proved to be inefficient. The original system was dependent on using travel documents to identify a history of entry into EU territories (Alonso, 2000). Considering how some asylum seekers must flee war or other urgent situations, it is unsurprising that many of those who fled their homes did not have the means to acquire all of their legal documentation as if they were leaving for a family vacation. Moreover, the Dublin Convention was crucially impaired by the incentive asylum seekers had, mainly due to the *authorization principle*, to destroy their documents if they had reason to suspect that they would be denied refugee status upon their first entry.

This lack of a common database that could be efficiently utilized to keep track of the history of asylum applications prompted the European Automated Fingerprint Recognition System (Eurodac), which would later be realized in 2003, the same year the Dublin II Regulations replaced the original Dublin Convention of 1990 (Friedrich, 2001).

Asylum policies were first included in the EU's framework in 1992 by the Treaty of Maastricht (Búrca, 2001). The European Union was created with three compositional pillars: The European community; common foreign and security policy; and cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs. Initially, Asylum policies were placed within the third pillar, which also included transportation across the EU's border. However, in 1997 with the Treaty of Amsterdam, asylum policies were moved from the third pillar to the first one pertaining to the European Community[8].

This shift in pillars signified a shift to a more centralized outlook on asylum policies. Because the Commission was justified in using a qualified majority voting in the Council (the Member States' interior ministers), what were intergovernmental initiatives could become supranational. "By obliging the council to take measures related to more substantive issues … this holistic approach was a first step to harmonize the asylum legislations of the member states" (Desimpelaere, 2015). Afterwards, the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) was launched in two stages[9]. The first stage consisted of the harmonization of certain asylum policies across member states by 2004. Several pre-refugee-status-determination conditions with regards to asylum seekers' access to employment, training, housing, subsistence, health, and education were given. However, focus was geared towards the minimum standards rather than ideal ones, rendering the first stage to be

The second stage, as a part of the Hauge Programme of 2004, unified the status

[8] Consolidated version of the treaty establishing the European Community.
[9] European Commission. (2016). Common European Asylum System.

of refugees across the EU. Although the deadline for the second stage was originally set to be 2010, the Council finalized two remaining legislative parts in 2013 (Peers, 2013). The second phase emphasized unifying the vast differences in Member States' asylum seeker recognition rates. The disparity was problematic due to it causing secondary applications where Member States with a higher recognition rate would inevitably end up picking up some of the applications that, under the original Dublin System's ideal, should have been accepted in Member States with a lower recognition rate. Furthermore, the growing subsidiary protection, i.e., protection that is given to those who have not been accepted as refugees, was clarified. For example, the waiting period before asylum seekers could apply for work was proposed to be shortened from 12 months to six; social assistance allowances were to be on par with those of nationals, but could be lower than citizens; and those with serious mental illnesses were to be provided with adequate health care.

Up until the early 2000s, in response these transnational efforts to shift European Asylum policies towards those more favorable towards asylum seekers and refugees, individual Member States resisted and attempted to retain control of their intake of refugees (Hatton & Tulip, 2008). The UK, for example, through an Act of 1993 and 1996, introduced an expedited refugee status determination process for those of 'safe' origins and transit countries; through the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act, not only tightened its border security and increased punishment for undocumented immigrants, but also relocated asylum seekers to centers outside London and gave them vouchers instead of welfare benefits; and through the 2002 Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act, no longer allowed the suspension of

deportation through appeals, and also limited work permits after six months from claiming asylum. In Denmark, the Aliens Act of 1983, revised later in the mid-1990s, 1998, and 2002, narrowed the scope of who they would accept as "refugees", making it more difficult to obtain permanent residency. Furthermore, it no longer allowed asylum claims to be made from outside its borders. The Netherlands tightened border controls in 1998. Through an Act of 2001, it narrowed the scope of subsidiary protection and made it more difficult to appeal denials of asylum claims.

This trend was also evident in non-EU states as well. In Australia's case, it introduced temporary three-year protection visas that curtailed the rights of 'onshore' asylum seekers (Tazreiter, 2003). In 2001, the MV Tampa, a Norweigian freighter, requested to land over 400 asylum seekers rescued from a sinking vessel onto Australian territory. Eventually, after a month-long negation failed, the asylum seekers were landed elsewhere. This incident prompted Australia to pass several anti-asylum bills: It removed several islands in order to limit asylum seekers' access to making claims in Australia; the definition of refugee was narrowed; the judicial accessibility for asylum seekers was reduced; and penalties for those aiding in the illegal immigration of people was increased. In the US, the 9/11 attacks led to an increase in border security through its PATRIOT Act; and an Act of 2002 integrated fingerprinting and biometric monitoring into its screening process. In Canada, an Act of 2001 introduced stronger detention methods for undocumented immigrants.

In the midst of these negative pushbacks against EU's overall positive push towards granting more favorable conditions to asylum seekers, EU kept pushing further during the mid-2000s. Set in 2005, the 'Global Approach to Migration and

Mobility[10]', (although it included 'preventing irregular migrants and trafficking'), was overall more humanitarian in nature when considering its other objectives: well-managed mobility, maximizing the effects of development of migration and mobility, and fostering international protection. This is further shown in the seven mobility agreements signed since 2008 (CONCORD, 2018): "Cape Verde, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Morocco, Azerbaijan and Tunisia; two 'less ambitious' agreements with Ethiopia and Nigeria; two regional dialogues (the Rabat and Khartoum Processes, for the Western and Eastern routes, respectively), and the EU-Africa Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment".

1.3. EU's Shift in Asylum Policies

Early in 2011, a cluster of what has been now termed as the "Arab Spring" occurred. It encompasses acts of dissent by the public against mostly authoritarian regimes in Arab territories. Authoritarian rulers in some parts of the Arab world such as Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen were overthrown; civil rebellions erupted in countries such as Bahrain and Syria and Bahrain; Activities of dissent occurred in Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, and Sudan; and protests of a similar nature but on a smaller scale erupted in places like Mauritania, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Djibouti, Western Sahara, and the Palestinian territories (Abdelsalam, 2015).

As a part of this greater phenomena, the Syrian Civil War was the most pronounced, which broke out in Syria in March 2011. This created a surge in the

[10] European Commission. (2019). Global Approach to Migration and Mobility.

number of displaced persons[11] that has reached an all-time high, unprecedented since WWII (UNHCR). Pro-democratic protests were met with military violence by the Assad regime, igniting nationwide demand for President Bashar al-Assad's resignation. Conflicts between protestors and the government has now evolved into a multifaceted, deadly engagement between several parties. More than 10 million Syrians have either been internally displaced or has fled their homes, with the majority of them taking refuge in neighboring countries (93%)[12].

As Syria's neighbors began to reach its limit in terms of intake capacity, refugees looked towards more distant destinations, including those of Europe. Due to the sudden inflow of asylum seekers, European asylum policies began to shift unfavorably towards asylum seekers.

In 2015, European nations began to take emphatic measures as the inflow of refugees began to increase (CONCORD, 2018), especially after the number of Syrian refugees increased by 103% that year (UNHCR Population Statistics). EU member states, for example, agreed on the 'European Agenda on Migration' to curb refugee inflows. With a focus on lessening the root causes of migration in the first place, EU's policies shifted from its previous focus on migration management to migration deterrence. One example would be the EU Action Plan on Return[13], signed on September 2015 which stressed the effectiveness of curbing migration through the increased number of detained irregular immigrants. This attitude is in stark contrast

[11] "Displaced Persons" is a broad term that encompasses refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, internally displaced persons, and other of concern.
[12] BBC. (2019). Why is there a war in Syria?
[13] ECRE. (2017). Return: No Safety in Numbers.

to EU's previous stance before the recent surge in refugees.

Another EU policy that exemplifies its shifting attitude is the EU-Turkey deal. In 2016, the EU and Turkey signed an agreement in which Turkey agreed to take back "illegal immigrants" in return for concessions on Turkey's EU membership. German Chancellor Angela Merkel expressed that "the most important part of this deal is that it will lend the business model of people smugglers and contribute to securing the EU's external borders"[14]. This not only affected the "people smugglers", but also those who were actually seeking asylum. It may partially explain why between the years 2016 to 2017, the growth rate of refugees in DAC members dropped from 29% to 18% for all refugees, but Syrian refugees' growth rate dropped from 142% to 25%.

One rebuttal against Europe's unfavorable change in asylum policies could be that the Dublin III Regulation of 2013, on the contrary, suggests that there have been efforts to extend international protection towards displaced persons, especially that of a third-country national or a stateless person[15]. This was an improvement to the previous state of the Dublin System where protection for stateless persons was prone to more interpretation. Furthermore, it also stressed how asylum seekers sent back to a country of transit should have efficient access to the refugee status determination process in the country from which they withdrew. Also, article 33 of the Dublin III regulation stipulates a "'mechanism for early warning, preparedness and crisis management". It provides for the setting up of a 'preventive action plan' or a 'crisis

[14] EU-Turkey migrant deal done | Europe| News and current ... (n.d.).

[15] Regulation (EU) No. 655/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council. (n. d.). *The European Account Preservation Order Regulation,* 47-61

management action plan', in case the application of the Regulation may be jeopardized due to a particular pressure on, or problems in the functioning of a Member State's asylum system. (Desimpelaere, 2015).

However, the European Commission's relocation scheme launched in 2015 is indicative of the shortcomings of the Dublin III Regulations. The regulation still pressured countries near the external borders of the EU (i.e., those that are more likely to be first-entry countries for asylum seekers) to disproportionately process refugees. For example, regulations have put a greater pressure on countries such as Greece and Italy. The relocation scheme, hoping to disperse the cluster of refugees situated on the outer borders of the EU to central countries (106,000 from Italy, 66,400 from Greece, and 39,600 from Italy), was largely unsuccessful and managed to achieve less than 20% of its intended target (O'Keeffe, 2017).

2. Refugee Intake

With regards to the recent 'refugee crisis', we can see that the numbers do express the severity of the situation. Below is a figure that illustrates the number of refugee stock and asylum inflow. UNHCR provides two different types of data for asylum seekers. One regards refugees who have successfully started the refugee status determination process, a legal or administrative process that asylum seekers go through to obtain refugee status. The other regards refugee applications that are lodged in a certain country. This thesis uses the second type because it is more comprehensive and representative of the displaced seeking refuge in that not all lodged asylum applications make it to the refugee status determination process.

For US' asylum seeker numbers, UNHCR provides numbers from two different institutions: one from the US Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR); and one from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This is because the US has two different types of asylum applications available: affirmative and defensive[16]. An application is affirmative if the alien is physically present in the United States and applies while *not* undergoing removal proceedings. *DHS*'s U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) processes the application. An asylum application is defensive when the applicant is appealing deportation and is undergoing removal proceedings with the Department of Justice's (DOJ's) *EOIR*.

Not all affirmative asylum seekers who are denied refugee status after applying

[16] Immigration: U.S. Asylum Policy - crsreports.congress.gov. (n.d.).

for the affirmative asylum process will undergo a defensive application. However, there are some who face the threat of deportation before making an affirmative asylum application. Therefore, in reality, the number of asylum seekers should be somewhere between the number of affirmative asylum applications and that of both the affirmative and defensive combined. For this thesis, in order to avoid double-counting those who have applied to both affirmative and defensive asylum procedures, only the numbers for the affirmative asylum process, provided by DHS, has been used.[17]

Figure 2.1. DAC - Refugee Stock[18]



Source: UNHCR Population Statistics

[17] See Appendix A for the exact figures pertaining to affirmative and defensive asyl um procedures in the US.

[18] See Appendix B for the exact aggregate figures pertaining to all DAC members

From 2013 to 2017, the number of accepted refugees in DAC member states increased by 87%. Overall, from the 2000s, refugee stock numbers decrease overall until 2013 but then soar. In relation to the Syrian refugee crisis, we can see that Syria alone accounts for a great portion (28%) of DAC member states' refugee stock. Also, it is notable that although the crisis began in 2011, the inflow of Syrian refugees was rather low for the first couple of subsequent years. One explanation could be that asylum seekers prioritize geographically closer regions when taking refuge. Costly travel methods that permit long distance travels such as flights are relatively inaccessible, and sometimes asylum seekers must immediately flee due to violent, civil conflicts. Then, it is unsurprising that asylum seekers gravitate towards neighboring countries first, before changing their final destination to more distant ones. Syria's neighbors, such as Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, are not part of OECD DAC. Therefore, the refugees that had been lodged in those countries were not captured by the numbers used in the figure above.

We can also see a general trend where refugee numbers trail behind asylum seeker inflows by about a year. Asylum seekers, in most cases, are not granted refugee status immediately, and sometimes must wait over a year for a verdict. One prediction that could be made from this trend is that refugee stock numbers for 2018 will not see a large increase when considering how asylum seeker numbers drastically dropped by 63% from 2016 to 2017.

This drop in annual asylum seekers can be associated with the change in the development of asylum policies that has happened since 2015. Tighter border controls have made it difficult for asylum seekers to submit asylum applications in the first

place.

2.1. Refugee Origins and Destinations

Refugees, do not only come from Syria. However, the countries where the most refugees originate from (for DAC members) are from the Middle East. According to the latest data from UNHCR, the top three country of origin for DAC members are all Middle Eastern countries, with Syria accounting for more than the next three countries of origin combined. Furthermore, we can see that after the Middle East, Africa is the runner up in terms of region of origin for refugees. The following table is the ranking of the top ten countries of origins, which accounts for 71% of all refugee flows into DAC member states.

Table 2.1. DAC - Refugee Origins

Top 10 Refugee Origins (2017)		
1	Syrian Arab Rep.	797,449
2	Afghanistan	250,086
3	Iraq	220,952
4	Eritrea	177,608
5	Various/Unknown	152,700
6	Somalia	111,650
7	Iran (Islamic Rep. of)	100,378
8	China	99,376
9	Russian Federation	59,711
10	Sri Lanka	51,864

Source: UNHCR Population Statistics

So where are the refugees finally hosted? For DAC members, the following is the ranking of the top ten destinations for refugees in 2017, the latest year refugee stock data available from UNHCR Population Statistics. It is noticeable that Germany's stock of refugees surpasses that of the next three DAC members combined.

Table 2.2. DAC - Territory of Asylum

Top 10 Destinations		
1	Germany	970,302
2	France	337,143
3	USA	287,965
4	Sweden	240,899
5	Italy	167,260
6	UK	121,766
7	Austria	115,197
8	Canada	104,748
9	Netherlands	103,818
10	Switzeland	92,995

Source: UNHCR Population Statistics

Throughout this thesis, the five highlighted countries will be examined more closely. In 2017, these five countries, out of the 29 DAC member states, accounted for 65% of all refugees and 78% of all Syrian refugees. A closer examination of the US has been excluded due to how it is exempt from overarching EU policies. Though the U.S. does take in a fair share of refugees, its refugee and ODA policies may be rather distinct from the EU policies that affects the highlighted five European countries comprehensively. Furthermore, as will be shown throughout the thesis, these five countries have distinct patterns of refugee intake and compositional ODA changes. This allows for an examination of a wide variety of circumstances surrounding refugees and ODA composition.

3. ODA Composition

How has the composition of ODA changed? The following are two figures. The one above depicts absolute ODA changes and the one below depicts relative compositional changes.[19]

Figure 3.1. DAC - Absolute ODA Changes (Constant 2016 US $, Millions)



[19] **100: I. Social Infrastructure & Services, Total**
200: II. Economic Infrastructure & Services, Total
300: III. Production Sectors, Total
400: IV. Multi-Sector / Cross-Cutting, Total
500: VI. Commodity Aid / General Programme Assistance, Total
600: VII. Action Relating to Debt, Total
700: VIII. Humanitarian Aid, Total
910: Administrative Costs of Donors, Total
930: Refugees in Donor Countries, Total
998: IX. Unallocated / Unspecified, Total

Figure 3.2. DAC - Relative ODA Changes



Source: OECD CRS Data

In recent years (2011-2017), the biggest increase in ODA can be seen in sector 930 (Refugees in Donor Countries, or "in-donor refugee costs"), which has increase by 247%. Among those seven years, the annual growth rate was biggest in 2015, the same year that the annual growth rate of the number of refugees was the biggest within the same time frame. Furthermore, the second sector with the biggest growth rate from 2011 to 2017 was sector 700 (humanitarian aid), which increased by 77%. That these two sectors are the top two sectors that have grown the most since 2011 suggests that DAC members are, in fact, responding to the humanitarian crises that have caused the surge in asylum seekers.

In-donor refugee costs, however, have been contested among DAC members. Before the refugee crisis, as can be seen in the figures above, the absolute and relative

significance of this sector was rather low. However, with refugee and asylum seeker inflows numbers having grown significantly, concerns and criticism regarding this sector have followed suit.

3.1. In-donor Refugee Costs

Instructions for reporting costs related to refugees lodged within a country's own borders were first introduced in 1988 and have recently been modified due to concerns over disparities in what DAC members regard as eligible for reporting as ODA. The existing guidelines specify that the donor country "record official sector expenditures for the sustenance of refugees in donor countries during the first twelve months of their stay"[20], including expenditures incurred from transporting the refugees into the donor country. However, costs related to the voluntary resettlement of refugees to another country and that related to forced departures are excluded.

OECD's rationale for including in-donor refugee costs in a country's ODA is that the protection of refugees is a legal obligation. Countries are bound by the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the subsequent 1967 Protocol. The 1951 Convention, ratified by 145 State parties, defines what a "refugee" and elaborates on the rights of the forcibly displaced, including the duties states have to protect these vulnerable people.[21]. In accordance to these legal frameworks, DAC states that assistance to refugees is "humanitarian" in nature and aims at "ensuring

[20] OECD (2010) DAC Statistical Reporting Directive

[21] United Nations. (n.d.). The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.

the dignity and human rights of the beneficiary populations".

Despite OECD's official stance on in-donor refugee costs, there exists several problems. First, and most importantly, there is the argument that in-donor refugee costs do not align with the core focus of ODA, i.e., it is not "administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective". Alliance Sud (2017), a Swiss alliance of development organizations, notes that although contributions towards asylum seekers are important, they digress from the theme of 'development'.

Second, there is concern that allowing in-donor refugee costs to count towards ODA diverts resources from other potential development sectors. Sometimes, the budget for in-donor refugee costs are obtained through the development agencies rather than other interior ministries. This indirectly decreases potential funding for what could have been development projects that would directly benefit developing countries (CONCORD, 2018).

Third, and possibly the most contested, is the disparity among countries in categories that are counted towards this ODA sector. Although most countries agree that "essential temporary sustenance provisions" such as food, clothing and accommodation, should be included, there are many types of expenditures that are not coherently accounted for when reporting in-donor refugee costs. These incoherent costs, e.g. professional training, resettling refugees in municipalities, administrative costs and police, interpretation and counselling, temporary costs for allowances, interpretation, administrative costs, etc., make it difficult for cross-country comparisons. Countries that have a wider scope when deciding what constitutes ODA

will have inflated ODA results when compared to those donors with a narrower scope. This becomes especially evident when considering how some countries, such as Luxemburg, flat out did not report in-donor refugee costs for certain years[22].

The disparity becomes even more evident when looking at the differences in starting points for the '12-month period specified by OECD' and the type of people that are relevant to a donor's calculation for in-donor refugee costs.

[22] For the years 2002-2017, Luxemburg reported in-donor refugee costs for only thre e years.

Table 3.1. In-Donor Refugee Costs: Refugees Included by DAC Memebrs



1. 2009 Average annual cost per refugee.
2. Estimate not specifically related to expenses reported as ODA.
3. Not until 2014. In 2015 Switzerland welcomed a contingent of Syrians and will include quota refugees in future.

Legend

asylum seekers granted asylum

rejected asylum seekers

all asylum seekers - granted asylum and rejected

Source: OECD. (2016). ODA Reporting of In-Donor Country Refugee Costs.

As seen above, some countries (e.g. Belgium, France, Portugal, and the United Kingdom) begin as soon as an asylum seeker enters the host country. From the point that a decision has been made with regards to the asylum seeker, these countries stop counting funds allocated towards those individuals as in-donor refugee costs. Belgium, however, will only count the funds used towards those that eventually obtained refugee status, whereas the other three will count funds towards all asylum seekers regardless of their eventual attainment of refugee status. Most of the other countries include funds allocated to asylum seekers even after their refugee status has been determined. Again, however, some donors only count funds that had been used towards those who had successfully received refugee status, whereas other donors include even those who had failed to do so. Some countries (Canada, Germany, and the United States) start their 12 month period only after a decision has been made regarding asylum seekers' attainment of refugee status. Furthermore, quota refugees (i.e. refugees who are recognized as refugees but are part of a resettlement program due to circumstances that do not afford them a permanent stay in their currently residing country) are not always counted towards in-donor refugee costs.

These numerous differences have raised concern regarding the quality of data, especially in the case of cross-country comparisons. OECD took notice of these concerns and in 2017, set out new guidelines to make in-donor refugee costs transparent and compatible among donors[23]. With regards to the definition of a "refugee", it now includes the "quota refugees" and only those asylum seekers who

[23] OECD. (2017). Clarifications to the Statistical Reporting Directives on In-Donor Refugee Costs.

are eventually denied asylum will be relevant to the in-donor refugee cost calculations. With regards to the '12-month rule', it applies from the date of application for asylum. If the asylum seeker entered a country via a resettlement program or for the purpose of family reunification, the 12-month period begins from the moment of entry.

Moreover, the new guidelines strongly stress the importance of reporting *temporary* costs as opposed to permanent ones. "Post-recognition care should be taken to only include expenses for sustenance that can still be qualified as temporary, and to exclude those of a more permanent nature that promote the integration of refugees into the economy of the donor country"[24]. This is an important clarification because it addresses the criticism that in-donor refugee costs fundamentally digress from the main focus of ODA, the "promotion of economic development and welfare of developing countries". If a refugee were to be integrated into a donor's economy, spending on that refugee would be far from aiding the developing nation of that refugee's nationality. Rather, it would be promoting a country's self-interest by funneling resources back into its own economy in the guise of ODA. Therefore, even within the 12-month limit, efforts by a donor to give non-provisional, sustainable help that leads to integration should be exempt from in-donor refugee costs. In addition to that, assistance that does not strive for humanitarian assistance, but is related to detainment, policing, or deportation has also become unreportable. Some of the now *non*-ODA eligible costs include the following: promotion of economic integration, including vocational training and job programs; construction costs for building

[24] Ibid.

accommodation for refugees; policing and border patrol costs; and costs related to deportation. All in all, the new guidelines can be said to have set in-donor refugee costs in the right direction.

Regarding the disparity among donor countries accounts of in-donor refugee costs, however, one suggestion could be made to make reports even more consistent. Donors should *have to* report certain costs as in-donor refugee costs. Currently, because donor countries are given the choice to report (or not report) in-donor refugee costs, some countries may feel as though it is not worth the effort to give an account of such costs if it takes up a miniscule amount of their total ODA. However, in such cases, the numbers themselves will fail to fully illuminate the differences between donors who do allocate resources to in-donor refugees but do not report it, and those who simply do not report it because they do not spend much in the first place.

3.2. Negative Effects of In-donor Refugee Costs

The disparity in ODA-eligible in-donor refugee costs among DAC members has been somewhat amended due to the clarifications explained above. However, that still does not resolve the concern some have over the negative effects of in-donor refugee costs, that it takes away from "real" ODA sectors that actually benefit the economic development and social well-being of *developing* countries 뮤우 ot the host country. There are two aspects to this concern. First, there is the factual question of whether or not in-donor refugee costs do take away potential spending from other ODA sectors. Second, and more importantly, there is the fundamental question of

whether or not helping an asylum seeker who is no longer physically in his or her country of nationality does promote the social well-being of developing countries. The second question is more important because the need for worries is contingent upon the second question rendering in-donor refugee costs as a quasi-sector in the first place. If the assumption can be made that in-donor refugee costs objectives do align with the fundamental principle of ODA, despite asylum seekers being physically outside the boundaries of their countries' borders, it dispenses with the need to raise the first question at all.

To elaborate on the first question, the ratio of 1) *All DAC members' total ODA to government spending* (indicator used: general government final consumption expenditures) and 2) the ratio of the *remaining **non**-in-donor refugee costs ODA sectors to government spending* can be compared. This comparison is made to show what ODA would have looked like if we do not factor only the in-donor refugee costs sector. Although many studies use donor countries' ODA/GNI share, government spending may be a closer representation of what donor governments are actually *willing* to spend. GNI, which measures the gross domestic product, plus net receipts from abroad of wages and salaries and of property income, plus net taxes and subsidies receivable from abroad would be a better indicator for the *potential* of a donor with regards to public spending.

Figure 3.3. DAC - ODA/Government Spending



	Year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
1	gr_(Total ODA/GGFCE)	7.07%	0.01%	-5.37%	9.85%	-2.37%	6.02%	7.06%	1.15%
2	gr_(Total ODA - IDRC/GGFCE)	6.96%	-0.65%	-5.70%	10.04%	-4.08%	-0.33%	4.13%	3.91%
3	gr difference (#2-#1)	-0.11%	-0.66%	-0.33%	0.19%	-1.71%	-6.35%	-2.93%	2.75%

Source: ODA (OECD DAC CRS DATA, Constant 2016 US $ Millions),
General Government Final Consumption Expenditure (WDI, Constant 2010 US $ Millions)

For DAC members as a whole, the worry that in-donor refugee costs take away from other potential sectors may seem to have some merit to it. The circled years refer to years in which the growth rate of *ODA(excluding in-donor refugee costs)/Government Spending* was lower than the growth rate of the ratio that includes in-donor refugee costs. In 2015, we can even see an occasion where the ratio including in-donor refugee costs increased by 6.02% while the ratio without it actually decreased by -0.33%. This could be evidence for how the donor governments may have had to divert resources away from the other sectors in order to meet rising costs for in-donor refugees. More importantly, however, the difference in ratios was

miniscule, considering how a difference of 6.35% in 2015 was the largest since 2002.

To make a more generalized statement, however, it would be better to disregard the outliers. The following scatterplot depicts the relationship (without the outliers) between the growth rate of 1) the ratio of *just the in-donor refugee costs to government spending* (gr_idrc) and 2) the ratio of *the remaining sectors to government spending* (gr_total).[25] Individual observations show the annual growth rates for each DAC member from the years 2011 to 2017. Now, a generalization can be made that as countries channel more money into the in-donor refugee costs sector, they do not necessarily channel less into the other ODA sectors. Furthermore, this generalization also holds when taking annual refugee stock changes and asylum seeker inflows into account[26].

[25] The excluded outliers have been highlighted in Appendix H.

Source: Refugees and Asylum Seekers: UNHCR Population StatisticsODA: OECD DAC CRS DATA (Constant 2016 US $, Millions),
General Government Final Consumption Expenditure: WDI (Constant 2010 US $, Millions)

Figure 3.4. Scatterplot of the Growth Rate of In-donor Refugee Costs and the Remaining Sector



Figure 3.5. Scatterplot of the Growth Rate of In-donor Refugee Costs and the Remaining Sectors *in Relation to Refugees*



Figure 3.6. Scatterplot of the Growth Rate of In-donor Refugee Costs and the Remaining Sectors in Relation to *Asylum Seekers*



On average, the correlation between the growth rate of in-donor refugee costs and the remaining sectors for DAC members seems weak at best. In the first scatterplot, the direct comparison of the growth rate of just the in-donor refugee costs sector and the remaining sectors, the correlation was nearly non-existent (0.0033) and the variables were statistically insignificant (p value = 0.9679). In the second scatterplot, a comparison of the two variables in relation to changes in annual refugee numbers, correlations for both the growth rate of in-donor refugee costs (0.07) and the growth rate for the remaining sectors (0.1) were both low. For the third scatterplot, a comparison of the two variables in relation to annual asylum seeker numbers, correlations were 0.146 and 0.12, respectively. The larger coefficient is indicative of how DAC members are more responsive towards asylum seekers. This is understandable when considering how asylum seekers put an immediate pressure on countries to act, whereas refugee numbers represent those who have undergone the legal or administrative process of a host country.

To move on to the second question, should in-donor refugee costs be counted as ODA in the first place? At the core of this question exists a divide between understanding development. One view argues that development should be focused on the geographical boundaries of a state and its economy. Another 'people-centered' view argues that development should be focused more on the human and social well-being. Shriwise and Bruzelius (2017) argue that the recent surge in asylum seekers and refugees challenge the pre-existing notion that economic, social, and human development objectives must be tied down to the physical borders of a nation state.

There is a “separation of people and territory as nationals move between countries”. Refugees as asylum seekers, by definition, are those who have moved beyond their national borders. Those who remain within their nation are termed as “internally displaced people”. Accepting that the refugee crisis is severe would be at the same time accepting that the origin countries’ state boundaries have become less relevant in global humanitarian assistance since so many in need of help are no longer within their national walls. Levitt et al (2017) focuses on the *individual* rather than the state, defining “transnational social protection” as the “policies, programmes, people, organizations, and institutions which provide for and protect *individuals* in… a transnational manner”, suggesting a focus on the ‘people-centered’ view of development as well. These are the appropriate context to understand development when it comes refugees who wish to return to their country of origin once the cause of their forced displacement is dismissed. There will inevitably be those who decide to pursue a permanent life outside their original national boundaries. The in-donor refugee costs criteria, however, does strive to omit costs related to resettlement and those of a permanent nature. It recognizes that channeling funds towards those who will eventually be integrated is a digression from the objective of the development of developing countries.

4. Country Profiles

The following section looks into the five European countries with the most amount of refugees. Although generalizations have been made above about DAC members as a whole, these five countries, which hosts nearly two thirds of all refugees in DAC member states, have different, distinct profiles.

4.1. Germany[27]

Figure 4.1. Germany - Absolute ODA Changes (Constant 2016 US $, Millions)



[27] See Appendix C for the exact aggregate figures pertaining to Germany.

Figure 4.2. Germany - Relative ODA Changes



Source: OECD CRS Data

Overall, Germany's ODA has increased significantly throughout the past decade. From 2011 to 2017, Germany's net ODA has increased by 147%. This number, however, is greatly due to in-donor refugee costs. Excluding in-donor refugee costs, the overall increase falls down to 82%. Following the 7,747% increase in in-donor refugee costs, humanitarian assistance has also risen significantly by 590%. Action relating to debt, on the other hand, greatly decreased in 2009 by 95%.

Figure 4.3. Germany - Refugee Stock



Source:UNHCR Population Statistics

When looking at the figure above, we can see how the surge in refugee flows in 2015 coincides with the great surge in in-donor refugee costs in 2015. Also, in-donor refugee flows peak at 2016 and falls in 2017, similar to the annual asylum seeker inflow. Though asylum seeker numbers did peak in 2016, we can see that it had been steadily rising before then, which could explain why the following initiatives were taken since the beginning of 2014 which aimed to reduce the occurrence of asylum seekers in the first place: 'Tackling the root causes of displacement, reintegrating refugees' aimed to remove the structural causes of displacement by providing short-term support to refugees, IDPs, and host communities; the 'Stability and development in the MENA region' supported the political transformation in the region by giving aid to projects that built peace, stabilized the economy, and fostered democracy; 'One World – No Hunger' aimed to eradicate hunger and malnutrition to circumvent food insecurity that could lead to

conflicts (FMECD, 2018).

There are two stricking differences between pre and post 2013. In 2013, germany saw a massive drop in refugee numbers, though it had been rather stagnant before then. Later on, in 2015, a sharp increase can be seen, which is in accordance with its increase in in-donor refugee costs. In 2012, before the sudden drop in refugee stock, there were 589,737 refugees, but the numbers suddenly drops to 187,567 the next year, decreasing by 68%. With regards to this decrease, the following 11 countries of origin had a decrease of at least 5,000 refugees. The decrease from these countries amounts for 79% (402170 to 316709) of the total decrease in 2013.

Table 4.1. Germany - Refugee Stock Decrease in 2013

	Country	Drop in Stock
1	Serbia and Kosovo	105,399
2	Turkey	66,324
3	Russian Federation	25,846
4	Vietnam	22,304
5	Bosnia and Herzegovina	22,116
6	Ukraine	19,798
7	Lebanon	11,370
8	Iraq	9,599
9	Various/Unknown	8,815
10	Sri Lanka	7,595
11	Afghanistan	7,543

Source: UNHCR Population Statistics

Pertaining to the in-donor refugee costs, the method used previously by seeing the ratio of ODA (with and without in-donor refugee costs) and government spending was used to illustrate whether or not in-donor refugee costs limited potential spending in other sectors. The circled years note those in the growth rate of ODA without the

in-donor refugee costs did not meet the growth rate of total ODA with the contested sector included. The most marked difference was in 2015 and 2016, where the difference in growth rate was 22.69% and 18.21% respectively. They suggest the potential for negative diversion in ODA due to in-donor refugee costs. Overall, however, the figure below shows that Germany has been steady increasing its ODA spending from 2009, regardless of whether or not in-donor refugee costs are taken into factor.

Figure 4.4. Germany - ODA/Government Spending



	Year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
1	gr_(Total ODA/GGFCE)	16.29%	1.31%	5.17%	4.95%	21.55%	26.24%	29.88%	-0.81%
2	gr_(Total ODA - IDRC/GGFCE)	16.26%	1.33%	5.28%	4.45%	21.58%	3.54%	11.67%	4.27%
3	gr difference (#2-#1)	-0.03%	0.02%	0.10%	-0.50%	0.03%	-22.69%	-18.21%	5.09%

Source: ODA (OECD DAC CRS DATA, Constant 2016 US $ Millions),
General Government Final Consumption Expenditure (WDI, Constant 2010 US $ Millions)

4.2. France[28]

Figure 4.5. France - Absolute ODA Changes (Constant 2016 US $, Millions)



Figure 4.6. France - Relative ODA Changes



[28] See Appendix D for the exact aggregate figures pertaining to France.

Source: OECD CRS Data

One noticeable change in France's ODA composition is the sharp decrease in sector 600 (action relating to debt) in 2014. It decreased by 91% in that single year and remained low until 2017. In 2015, sector 400 (multi-sector/ cross-cutting) suddenly increased by 35%, but subsequently decreased by almost the same amount (36%) the following year. In 2017, France saw a marked increase in sector 500 (Commodity Aid / General Programme Assistance) by 196%. Overall, total ODA has been going through constant increases and decreases since 2002. Recently (since 2015) it has been increasing. Furthermore, what is interesting is how, compared to the steady increase in refugee stock from 1997 shown below, in-donor refugee costs remain rather stagnant and low. The stagnant number of annual asylum seekers seem to be a better indicator. Since 2002, with the exception of 2005, France's growth rate in refugee stock has been positive.

Figure 4.7. France - Refugee Stock



Source:UNHCR Population Statistics

The above figure shows how France has succesfully managed to limit asylum seekers from entering its borders for the past 15 years. This is evident in many instances where government plans to expand immigration was met with criticism by the public. For example, in 2015, when past President Francois Hollande proposed to accept 24,000 refugees by 2017, dissent was cleary shown by the opposition party and the public (Reuters, 2015). National Front leader Marine Le Pen stated that France had “neither the means, nor the energy, nor the desire to be more generous than it can be toward the world’s misery”. The former president president Nicolas Sarkozy, leader of the conservative opposition Republican party, argued for detention camps to be set up in neighboring countries under EU control to limit refugees opting for the Mediterranean route. The public oppinion was also against this proposal to accept refugees, with 55 percent of French people opposing procedures that expanded were favorable to incoming asylum seekers.

The “Calais Jungle”, (named after the translation of the Pashto[29] word "dzhangal" which means forest) an unofficial refugee camp of squalid living conditions in northern France, also illustrates France’s attidue towards those who seek asylum. Its origins date back to 1999 when the Red Cross in Sangatte, a village about a mile from the Eurotunnel entrance to the UK, built a migrant center with the help of the French government (BBC, 2016). In 2002, after the migrant center closed down, many of the refugees relocated to nearby woods, with poor living conditions where

[29] Pashto is one of the two official Afghani languages and is the second-largest regi onal language in Pakistan. It was used by many asylum seekers who entered the Cal ais Jungle (The Sun, 2017).

some had to use water contaminated by nearby chemical plants. Although bulldozzed in 2009, the French government did not implement measures to relocated the 1000 or so asylum seekers who were living there, leading to another makeshift camp in 2014. This time, the French government was pressured to open up a migrant center due to even more people (about 7000) who began to live in public spaces. Although the "Jungle" was demolished in 2016, asylum seekers, many of whom want to enter into the UK, decide to enter or come back to the rat infested jungle. In 2017 alone, authorities tore down 26 sub-camps near the region (Infomigrants, 2018) illustrating Macron's stict stance against incoming asylum seekers.

As done previously, below, the circled years pertain to those (after 2010) in which the growth rate of the ODA/government spending ratio excluding in-donor refugee costs was lower than that which included in-donor refugee costs. Although that was the case for many of the years since 2010, the highest difference in percentages was only 1.1% in 2017, showing how in-donor refugee costs have a miniscule effect on France's ODA spending. This, moreover, is unsurprising when considering how in-donor refugee share in total ODA has been overall small. France's success in curtailing asylum seekers in the first place has rendered in-donor refugee costs to be rather irrelevant in its ODA spending, despite it hosting the second-largest amount of refugees among DAC members.

Figure 4.8. France - ODA/Government Spending



	Year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
1	gr_(Total ODA/GGFCE)	14.95%	-5.50%	2.37%	-16.54%	-1.63%	-4.16%	7.70%	11.82%
2	gr_(Total ODA - IDRC/GGFCE)	14.81%	-6.58%	2.64%	-16.61%	-2.02%	-3.65%	6.64%	10.72%
3	gr difference (#2-#1)	-0.14%	-1.08%	0.27%	-0.06%	-0.40%	0.50%	-1.07%	-1.10%

Source: ODA (OECD DAC CRS DATA, Constant 2016 US $ Millions),
General Government Final Consumption Expenditure (WDI, Constant 2010 US $ Millions)

4.3. Sweden[30]

Figure 4.9. Sweden - Absolute ODA Changes (Constant 2016 US $, Millions)



Figure 4.10. Sweden - Relative ODA Changes



Source: OECD CRS Data

[30] See Appendix E for the exact aggregate figures pertaining to Sweden.

Overall, Swedish ODA has increased 26% since 2011, but it has largely been due to in-donor refugee costs. Most of the other sectors have been stagnant composition-wise. In-donor refugee costs, alone, increased 102% during that period, and without it, Swedish ODA's overall increase drops down from 26% to 14%. This strong focus in-donor refugee costs is not too surprising when looking at the increase in refugee numbers from 2011, from the onset of the Arab Spring.

Figure 4.11. Sweden - Refugee Stock



Source:UNHCR Population Statistics

In 2015, the number of asylum seekers entering Sweden skyrocketed. This explains the stark contrast between Sweden's stance on asylum policies before and after 2015. Sweden once was once considered the most "generous nation" when it came to asylum seekers (PRI, 2017). In 2014, Former Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt urged Sweden to "open their hearts" to asylum seekers (The Local, 2014). In an daring speech by a minister, weeks before an election, Reinfeldt stated that

government spending pledges would have to be halted for the time being due to the costs of hosting asylum seekers: "We will promise no more in this election campaign". As his speech indicates, Sweden was very favorable towards incoming asylum seeekers, and the population of just 10 million welcomed 165,000 asylum seekers — more per capita than any other European nation at the time. This is illustrated by how in-donor refugee costs were compositionally the single greatest sector in 2014, even *before* asylum seeker numbers hit its peak.

However, Sweden became overwhelmed by the surge in asylum seekers and began to shift its stance. In 2016, the year after its peak in asylum seeker numbers, Sweden enacted a retroactive, temporary law, valid for three years. It made family reunification far more difficult (PRI 2017). The law was retroactive to November 2015 and immediately stopped immigrants from bringing their immediate family members to Sweden, including even those who had been issued residency permits.

Furthermore, Sweden has not been fully responsible for unacompanied minors (The Global Post, 2019). 35,000 of the 160,000 asylum seekers who came to Sweden in 2015 were registered as "unaccompanied minors". Due to the change in asylum policies in 2016, in conjunction with longer asylum procedures and a new controversial age assesment system, some of those who were registered as minors were no longer "minors" by the time their asylum application was processed. As a result many were denied even a temporary residency permit.

Figure 4.12. Sweden - ODA/Government Spending



	Year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
1	gr_(Total ODA/GGFCE)	-10.02%	10.64%	1.20%	2.06%	13.16%	30.50%	-29.84%	6.63%
2	gr_(Total ODA - IDRC/GGFCE)	-13.31%	10.92%	-1.55%	-0.54%	3.42%	-11.21%	5.57%	9.09%
3	gr difference (#2-#1)	-3.29%	0.27%	-2.75%	-2.59%	-9.74%	-41.71%	35.40%	2.46%

Source: ODA (OECD DAC CRS DATA, Constant 2016 US $ Millions), General Government Final Consumption Expenditure (WDI, Constant 2010 US $ Millions)

As done previously, the ratios have been compared. Sweden's ODA/Government Spending ratio with regards to with and without in-donor refugee costs depicts a four-year period where the growth rate of the ratio without in-donor refugee costs was lower than that which included in-donor refugee costs. Although the difference in percentages was less than 3% for the years 2012 and 2013, the difference widens to 9.7% in 2014 and skyrockets to 41.7% in 2015. The argument that in-donor refugee costs have potentially taken away funds from other sectors becomes more evident when considering how Sweden's overall ODA/government spending ratio without in-donor refugee costs remain stagnant, and has not exceeded

its all-time high (among the years observed) 2.35%, achieved in 2006. **4.4. Italy**[31]

Figure 4.13. Italy - Absolute ODA Changes (Constant 2016 US $, Millions)



Figure 4.14. Italy - Relative ODA Changes



Source: OECD CRS Data

[31] See Appendix F for the exact aggregate figures pertaining to Italy.

Italy's overall ODA composition shows a sharp contrast before and after 2012. Sector 600 (action relating to debt) had the biggest sector share for seven years out of 10. Yet, in 2012, the sector share decreased by 99%, falling from $668 million to $6 million. On the other hand, in-donor refugee costs have increased tremendously. Starting from 2012, it has had the largest compositional share among ODA sectors. From 2011 total ODA spending increased by 89%. However, as seen in some previous cases, taking away in-donor refugee costs drops the increase from 89% to 12%. Percentage-wise, the sector increased by 14,128% in 2011.

Figure 4.15. Italy - Refugee Stock[32]



Source:UNHCR Population Statistics

With regards to refugee stock, it is similar to that of France in that the growth

[32] Asylum seeker's annual flow for Italy is missing before the years 2007 due to data availability.

rate has been positive for an extended period of time. The difference between the two is that Italy has experienced a surge rather than a steady increase as France did. Similar to Germany's case, in-donor refugee costs surge near the period that refugee stock surges. Also, it is distinct from the other four selected DAC members in that it suddenly saw an early surge of asylum seekers in 2011, after a pronounced downward trend. This is representative of how Italy is one the early destinations for those fleeing conflicts in the Middle East and Northern African region, especially due to the Arab Spring.

In response to this sudden increase in asylum seekers, the Italian government requested the European Commission to broaden the sharing of responsibility by its Member States in terms of asylum seekers. (Nascimbene & Pascale, 2011) One example of its external policy advocacy is its support for the transformation of Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, into an operational agency. By strengthening Frontex, which manages the identification and deportation of those entering into the Schengen Area, Italy would be able to utilize the European Commission's resources for the protection of its southern borders. Furthermore, Italy also requested a more uniform asylum seeker system to be implemented through UNHCR.

Internally, Italy, declared the situation to be one of national emergency and issued a special decree of the President of the Council[33]. On this basis, a Special Commissioner was appointed to handle the emergency and was given special

[33] Decree of 12.2.2011

privalleges, icnluding exemptions when it came to the use of force.

In more recent years, as even more asylum seekers have poured into its borders, Italy has implemented several policies that strengthened its external borders. An interesting case is an MOU signed between former Italian Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni and Fayez al-Serraj, head of the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (Aspenia Online, 2018). The agreement, reactivated the 2008 Friendship Treaty between Italy and Libya, which pertained to Italy's $5 reimbursement of Libya for its past occupancy for Libya's support in retaining potential asylum seekers and receiving those who were sent back. The 2017 MOU focused on outsourcing the containment and deterrence of migrants from Libya by enhancing the technical capacity of the Libyan Navy and Coast Guard.

Figure 4.16. Italy - ODA/Government Spending



	Year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
1	gr_(Total ODA/GGFCE)	-3.28%	94.64%	-60.91%	31.34%	48.31%	53.79%	31.38%	25.96%
2	gr_(Total ODA - IDRC/GGFCE	-3.63%	43.76%	-65.15%	17.92%	6.85%	73.06%	-8.79%	66.22%
3	gr difference (#2-#1)	-0.34%	-50.88%	-4.23%	-13.43%	-41.45%	19.27%	-40.17%	40.27%

Source: ODA (OECD DAC CRS DATA, Constant 2016 US $ Millions),
General Government Final Consumption Expenditure (WDI, Constant 2010 US $ Millions)

Of the five countries that are covered, with regards to the growth rates of ODA/government Spending ratio with and without in-donor refugee costs, Italy shows the biggest difference. For example, in 2011, 2014, and 2016, the difference in percentages all exceed 40%. Furthermore, we can see that although the ratio excluding in-donor refugee costs has recently (2017) caught up to its previous level achieved in 2011, the ratio including in-donor refugee costs had already caught up in 2015. Though the growth rates may be staggering, when observing the absolute number of the ratio, it is relatively lower than the other four countries considering how it is always under 1%.

5.5. United Kingdom[34]

Figure 4.17. UK - Absolute ODA Changes (Constant 2016 US $, Millions)



Figure 4.18. UK - Relative ODA Changes



Source: OECD CRS Data

[34] See Appendix G for the exact aggregate figures pertaining to the UK.

Overall, the United Kingdom's Net ODA has been rising since the early 2000s. Other than two outlier years (2005 and 2006), where action relating to debt had the largest sector share, social infrastructure has consistently maintained the highest sector share. One noticeable change in ODA composition in recent years is the United Kingdom's focus on humanitarian aid. When looking at purely the growth rate from 2011 to 2017, in-donor refugee costs is significantly higher at 1659%. This percentage, however, becomes less significant when considering how social infrastructure and humanitarian aid is more than 9.5 and 3.5 times higher than in-donor refugee costs in terms of absolute value.

The United Kingdom, though among the top DAC members in terms of refugee stock in 2017, is the only country among the five examined that decreased its refugee stock in the past several years. After its peak in 2005, it has continuously reduced its refugee stock, and has seen little growth since 2014, despite that being a common year for large refugee stock increases in the other four countries.

Figure 4.19. UK - Refugee Stock



Source:UNHCR Population Statistics

What is notable is not only the relative low number of asylum seekers considering its refugee stock, but that the refugee stock is itself decreasing. Of the five discussed countries, it is the only country to have steadily decreased its refugee stock. This may be explained by its efforts to deport refugees. For example, the Labour government began setting deportation targets in 2000, from 8000 deportations to 12000 deportations in 2001. In 2001, the UK Home Office announced an increase in expenditure on enforcement and a new target of removing 30,000 people per year (Wintour, 2001).

With regards to the low asylum seeker numbers, one explanation is that it is geographically safeguarded, surrounded by waters and many EU Member States that must be crossed in order to set foot in the UK. One example would the be Calais Jungle, mentioned in the case of France. Asylum seekers, wishing to cross into the UK from France, attemp to stay in the Jungle as a temporary checkpoint, albeit unsuccesfully. However, the UK has been known for its strict stance against asylum seekers and immigrants, and it is clearly shown in its asylum policies.

In the UK, legislation in 2002 marked the beginning of Prime Minister Tony Blair's "purge" of asylum seekers (Hatton, 2011). Since 2002 the majority of asylum seekers have been prohibited from the labour market, including jobs designated as 'shortage occupation' jobs. Previously, if their asylum procedures had been prolonged for over 12 months, they may have had an opportunity (Mayblin, 2014). These limitations serve as an anti-pull factor, deterring potential asylum seekers from even attempting to enter into the UK in the first place.

Other policies include limiting the time of exceptional leave that Afghani and Somalian asylum seekers are granted down to a year; legislating for a "white list" of "manifestly unfounded applicants, where lodging an appeal will no longer suspend their removal; and identifying new sites in the north-west and near Stansted to build removal centres to aid deportation. One of the more drastic measures was shown when Tony Blair considered proposals to mobilize Royal Navy warships to intercept people traffickers in the Mediterranean and carry out bulk deportations in RAF transport planes.

In 2006 the Immigration and Nationality Directorate was replaced by the UK Border Agency (UKBA) and was followed by tighter border controls and biometric visas. Immigration officers could now require foreign nationals to have a biometric immigration document (UK Borders Act 2007). Selective electronic monitoring, identity cards, contributed to the profiling and screening of foreign citizens. The Identity Cards Act (2006) established a National Identity Register which was deemed "necessary in the public interest for the purposes of national security, prevention and detection of crime, enforcement of immigration controls, and enforcement of prohibitions on unauthorised working or employment"[35]. The data obtained by the immigration office could be transferred to the national identity register and used screen those trying to reenter into the UK with a different identity.

[35] Identity Cards Act, 2006, Explanatory Notes, 3-4.

Figure 4.20. UK - ODA/Government Spending



	Year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
1	gr_(Total ODA/GGFCE)	7.54%	-1.05%	-0.80%	23.14%	-1.11%	5.90%	8.48%	1.07%
2	gr_(Total ODA - IDRC/GGFCE	7.47%	-1.19%	-0.95%	23.20%	-2.51%	4.42%	6.81%	1.59%
3	gr difference (#2-#1)	-0.07%	-0.14%	-0.15%	0.06%	-1.40%	-1.48%	-1.68%	0.53%

Source: ODA (OECD DAC CRS DATA, Constant 2016 US $ Millions),
General Government Final Consumption Expenditure (WDI, Constant 2010 US $ Millions)

The UK's ODA/government spending ratio growth comparison is rather uneventful considering how the difference in percentages never exceed 1.7% and also because the gap itself is miniscule. This is representative of the EU's strict policies against immigration and asylum seekers.

5. ODA Channels

ODA, by definition, must be "provided by official agencies"[36], and channels in which programs and projects are implemented are numerous. OECD divides channels into seven categories (public sector; NGOs & civil society; multilateral organizations; teaching institutions, research institutes or think-tanks; private sector institutions; other; and not reported). DAC members, as a whole, mostly channel ODA through public sectors. However, as can be seen below, this tendency is overwhelmingly strong for the five examined European countries. Percentages above 1% have been highlighted.

Table 5.1. Composition of In-Donor Refugee Costs by Channel

	Year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
DAC	Public Sector	90.16%	93.18%	92.16%	95.00%	95.66%	95.05%	96.43%	94.43%
	NGOs & Civil Society	5.76%	3.67%	3.98%	3.65%	3.45%	1.57%	2.14%	2.91%
	Multilateral Organisations	4.08%	3.11%	3.85%	1.32%	0.71%	1.45%	1.33%	0.01%
	Teaching institutions, research institutes or think-tanks	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.24%
	Private Sector Institutions	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.10%	0.13%
	Other	0.00%	0.04%	0.00%	0.02%	0.02%	1.91%	0.00%	0.28%
	Not reported	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.16%	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%
Germany	Public Sector	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
France	Public Sector	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	93.96%	93.03%
	NGOs & Civil Society	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	6.04%	6.97%
Sweden	Public Sector	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Italy	Public Sector	100.00%	99.11%	100.00%	99.72%	99.89%	99.91%	99.92%	99.94%
UK	Public Sector	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	99.92%	100.00%	100.00%

Source: OECD Stats

For DAC members, on average, the public sector takes up about 95% of the composition. Of the five examined countries, with the exception of France, The tendency to channel in-donor refugee costs through the public sector is extremely

[36] OECD (2010) DAC Statistical Reporting Directive

strong, nearing 100% for the remaining four countries throughout the years 2010-2017. This tendency, for not only the four countries, but also DAC members as a whole, is not surprising when considering how migration may be considered to be directly related to national security. States would opt for the public sector since the central government would have more control over matters. France, on the other hand, has implemented more than twice the DAC average percentage of in-donor refugee costs through NGOs & Civil Societies.

6. Conclusion

In relation to the recent refugee crisis, DAC members' overall ODA composition has changed. One salient change has been an increase in humanitarian assistance, related to assistance for those in need of immediate help, such as internally displaced people in conflict ridden regions. This focus aims to prevent potential asylum seekers and refugees from occurring in the first place rather than assisting those who are in need today. This change in ODA can also be seen in the shift in policies that has happened since the beginning of 2010. Though they *had been* suggestive of an asylum policy paradigm in which "management" was the core focus in the mid-2000s, the great surge in asylum seekers has caused countries to opt for asylum policies of "deterrence".

However, the most contested change regarding ODA composition is the increase in in-donor refugee costs. A substantial amount of worry stems from an incoherent guideline that caused disparities among donors with regards to expenditures' ODA-eligibility. The new clarifications proposed by OECD in 2017, however, will help amend this problem.

Even so, clearly established guidelines may still not be enough to placate the worry that in-donor refugee costs fundamentally digresses from the core belief surrounding ODA's main objective: ODA should be channeled to developing countries for their economic development and social well-being. At the same time, we must remember, however, that real refugees and asylum seekers are not 'voluntary' migrants. This can clearly be seen when looking at the deaths of those who risk their

lives by crossing the Mediterranean, not in the hopes of finding a better job, but to relieve themselves of dire situations back home, such as civil wars. Treating them as prima facie economic migrants misconstrues their nature, and many of them long to return home. OECD's new guidelines and its original '12-month rule' exclude *non-temporary* assistance. Therefore, it limits countries from promoting self-interest through channeling ODA funds to asylum seekers who will eventually be integrated into the host country. Furthermore, when taking away the outliers in observations, we see that the growth rate of in-donor refugee costs do not necessarily bring down the growth rate of the remaining sectors for DAC members as a whole. Therefore, a more fruitful approach to criticism on this sector should be narrowed down to an individual state or a group of selectively chosen states.

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Appendices

A. Figures for US' Affirmative and Defensive Asylum Procedures

Year	(INS/DHS) **Affirmative**	(EOIR) **Defensive**
2,000	45,468	17,484
2,001	61,710	18,446
2,002	57,957	19,251
2,003	38,749	19,533
2,004	26,729	14,938
2,005	24,616	14,305
2,006	24,786	17,180
2,007	25,367	14,078
2,008	25,342	13,848
2,009	25,526	14,300
2,010	29,289	14,528
2,011	37,113	22,062
2,012	43,053	23,151
2,013	45,374	22,869
2,014	63,907	32,139
2,015	90,579	45,385
2,016	124,251	80,559
2,017	137,697	123,114
2,018	72,881	30,822

Source: UNHCR Population Statistics

B. Asylum Seekers, Refugees, ODA, and GGFCE Figures for DAC Members (Aggregate)

Year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Asylum seekers (Annual Flow)	324,126	382,302	411,530	489,107	677,394	1,436,084	1,397,410	881,037
Refugee (Stock)	1,922,793	1,877,354	1,876,462	1,517,014	1,637,770	1,873,974	2,410,208	2,842,576
Syrian Refugees (Stock)	17,425	18,681	37,052	65,438	129,988	264,150	638,783	797,449
100: I. Social Infrastructure & Services	38,818	38,807	38,505	38,069	38,740	36,819	39,932	41,283
200: II. Economic Infrastructure & Services	12,988	12,582	12,555	13,483	14,260	15,229	14,533	16,326
300: III. Production Sectors	6,791	6,668	6,248	6,553	6,636	6,936	6,957	7,652
400: IV. Multi-Sector / Cross-Cutting	10,302	8,956	7,860	8,999	9,298	10,209	10,249	9,491
500: VI. Commodity Aid / General Programme Assistance	3,991	3,678	3,308	5,086	2,252	2,552	2,457	3,018
600: VII. Action Relating to Debt	4,037	5,904	3,071	6,126	1,309	623	2,582	801
700: VIII. Humanitarian Aid	9,340	8,962	8,030	10,067	12,284	13,401	14,352	15,824
910: Administrative Costs of Donors	5,555	5,564	6,357	6,073	5,791	6,302	6,357	7,431
930: Refugees in Donor Countries	3,356	3,958	4,051	4,282	5,849	12,269	16,155	13,723
998: IX. Unallocated / Unspecified	1,854	1,465	1,367	1,519	1,976	1,632	1,831	2,147
1000: Total All Sectors	97,032	96,544	91,350	100,256	98,395	105,970	115,403	117,695
Total ODA - In Donor Refugee Costs (Sector: 600)	93,676	92,586	87,300	95,974	92,546	93,702	99,248	103,972
General Government Final Consumption Expenditures	8,104,093	8,062,426	8,061,336	8,053,701	8,096,421	8,224,484	8,365,663	8,434,406
Total ODA/GGFCE	1.20%	1.20%	1.13%	1.24%	1.22%	1.29%	1.38%	1.40%
(Total ODA - IDRC)/GGFCE	1.16%	1.15%	1.08%	1.19%	1.14%	1.14%	1.19%	1.23%
gr_(Total ODA/GGFCE)	7.07%	0.01%	-5.37%	9.85%	-2.37%	6.02%	7.06%	1.15%
gr_(Total ODA - IDRC/GGFCE)	6.96%	-0.65%	-5.70%	10.04%	-4.08%	-0.33%	4.13%	3.91%

Source: Refugees and Asylum Seekers: UNHCR Population Statistics
ODA: OECD DAC CRS DATA (Constant 2016 US $, Millions),
General Government Final Consumption Expenditure: WDI (Constant 2010 US $, Millions)

C. Asylum Seekers, Refugees, ODA, and GGFCE Figures for Germany

	Germany							
Year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Asylum seekers (Annual Flow)	41,332	45,741	64,539	109,580	173,072	441,899	722,364	180,863
Refugee (Stock)	594,269	571,684	589,737	187,567	216,973	316,115	669,482	970,302
100: I. Social Infrastructure & Services	3,958	3,816	4,030	4,044	4,442	4,790	5,637	6,070
200: II. Economic Infrastructure & Services	2,347	2,179	1,766	2,381	3,337	4,223	3,654	3,320
300: III. Production Sectors	430	469	516	632	595	794	804	1,049
400: IV. Multi-Sector / Cross-Cutting	829	948	1,199	1,157	1,420	1,561	1,977	1,842
500: VI. Commodity Aid / General Programme Assistance	135	191	167	82	122	143	373	226
600: VII. Action Relating to Debt	199	393	784	537	956	80	43	101
700: VIII. Humanitarian Aid	297	368	364	510	753	814	2,025	2,543
910: Administrative Costs of Donors	354	375	454	483	518	533	499	737
930: Refugees in Donor Countries	75	75	70	122	148	3,049	6,585	5,853
998: IX. Unallocated / Unspecified	53	57	78	81	91	99	122	141
1000: Total All Sectors	8,676	8,872	9,429	10,029	12,380	16,087	21,719	21,882
Total ODA - In Donor Refugee Costs (Sector: 600)	8,601	8,797	9,358	9,907	12,233	13,038	15,134	16,029
General Government Final Consumption Expenditures	653,386	659,528	666,454	675,471	685,990	706,115	734,014	745,579
Total ODA/GGFCE	1.33%	1.35%	1.41%	1.48%	1.80%	2.28%	2.96%	2.93%
(Total ODA - IDRC)/GGFCE	1.32%	1.33%	1.40%	1.47%	1.78%	1.85%	2.06%	2.15%
gr_(Total ODA/GGFCE)	16.29%	1.31%	5.17%	4.95%	21.55%	26.24%	29.88%	-0.81%
gr_(Total ODA - IDRC/GGFCE)	16.26%	1.33%	5.28%	4.45%	21.58%	3.54%	11.67%	4.27%

Source: Refugees and Asylum Seekers: UNHCR Population Statistics
ODA: OECD DAC CRS DATA (Constant 2016 US $, Millions),
General Government Final Consumption Expenditure: WDI (Constant 2010 US $, Millions)

D. Asylum Seekers, Refugees, ODA, and GGFCE Figures for France

	France							
Year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Asylum seekers (Annual Flow)	47,791	51,913	55,255	60,461	59,025	74,296	70,748	91,705
Refugee (Stock)	200,687	210,207	217,865	232,487	252,264	273,126	304,546	337,143
100: I. Social Infrastructure & Services	2,529	2,336	2,697	2,125	2,407	2,028	2,590	2,568
200: II. Economic Infrastructure & Services	587	917	1,219	1,232	1,410	1,142	1,430	1,707
300: III. Production Sectors	306	486	517	353	393	328	451	697
400: IV. Multi-Sector / Cross-Cutting	1,856	1,391	849	1,161	1,093	1,474	947	690
500: VI. Commodity Aid / General Programme Assistance	418	597	463	265	223	274	216	839
600: VII. Action Relating to Debt	1,498	1,132	1,390	991	92	198	139	145
700: VIII. Humanitarian Aid	89	71	55	35	42	36	153	79
910: Administrative Costs of Donors	385	387	436	438	464	470	507	540
930: Refugees in Donor Countries	381	451	449	385	410	364	467	606
998: IX. Unallocated / Unspecified	331	235	251	65	491	488	527	541
1000: Total All Sectors	8,381	8,004	8,324	7,050	7,026	6,801	7,426	8,413
Total ODA - In Donor Refugee Costs (Sector: 600)	8,000	7,553	7,876	6,665	6,615	6,438	6,959	7,807
General Government Final Consumption Expenditures	633,942	640,613	650,856	660,448	669,068	675,802	685,081	694,091
Total ODA/GGFCE	1.32%	1.25%	1.28%	1.07%	1.05%	1.01%	1.08%	1.21%
(Total ODA - IDRC)/GGFCE	1.26%	1.18%	1.21%	1.01%	0.99%	0.95%	1.02%	1.12%
gr_(Total ODA/GGFCE)	14.95%	-5.50%	2.37%	-16.54%	-1.63%	-4.16%	7.70%	11.82%
gr_(Total ODA - IDRC/GGFCE)	14.81%	-6.58%	2.64%	-16.61%	-2.02%	-3.65%	6.64%	10.72%

Source: Refugees and Asylum Seekers: UNHCR Population Statistics
ODA: OECD DAC CRS DATA (Constant 2016 US $, Millions),
General Government Final Consumption Expenditure: WDI (Constant 2010 US $, Millions)

E. Asylum Seekers, Refugees, ODA, and GGFCE Figures for Sweden

	Sweden							
Year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Asylum seekers (Annual Flow)	31,819	29,648	43,887	54,259	75,091	156,459	22,411	20,689
Refugee (Stock)	82,629	86,615	92,872	114,175	142,207	169,520	230,164	240,899
100: I. Social Infrastructure & Services	1,024	1,087	1,238	1,244	1,313	1,184	1,274	1,423
200: II. Economic Infrastructure & Services	134	171	202	208	175	151	144	212
300: III. Production Sectors	155	160	198	196	183	179	183	219
400: IV. Multi-Sector / Cross-Cutting	267	279	216	242	264	281	324	385
500: VI. Commodity Aid / General Programme Assistance	115	117	103	91	38	70		0
600: VII. Action Relating to Debt		152						
700: VIII. Humanitarian Aid	349	400	379	363	488	378	463	462
910: Administrative Costs of Donors	207	209	199	202	205	216	225	205
930: Refugees in Donor Countries	364	399	482	567	911	2,399	821	808
998: IX. Unallocated / Unspecified	97	50	79	87	98	55	136	94
1000: Total All Sectors	2,712	3,025	3,095	3,200	3,675	4,912	3,571	3,808
Total ODA - In Donor Refugee Costs (Sector: 600)	2,348	2,626	2,614	2,633	2,764	2,514	2,749	2,999
General Government Final Consumption Expenditures	122,979	123,995	125,369	126,986	128,906	132,012	136,766	136,789
Total ODA/GGFCE	2.21%	2.44%	2.47%	2.52%	2.85%	3.72%	2.61%	2.78%
(Total ODA - IDRC)/GGFCE	1.91%	2.12%	2.08%	2.07%	2.14%	1.90%	2.01%	2.19%
gr_(Total ODA/GGFCE)	-10.02%	10.64%	1.20%	2.06%	13.16%	30.50%	-29.84%	6.63%
gr_(Total ODA - IDRC/GGFCE)	-13.31%	10.92%	-1.55%	-0.54%	3.42%	-11.21%	5.57%	9.09%

Source: Refugees and Asylum Seekers: UNHCR Population Statistics
ODA: OECD DAC CRS DATA (Constant 2016 US $, Millions),
General Government Final Consumption Expenditure: WDI (Constant 2010 US $, Millions)

F. Asylum Seekers, Refugees, ODA, and GGFCE Figures for Italy

	Italy							
Year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Asylum seekers (Annual Flow)	10,052	40,356	17,352	25,720	63,657	83,243	122,124	126,376
Refugee (Stock)	56,397	58,060	64,779	76,264	93,715	118,047	147,370	167,260
100: I. Social Infrastructure & Services	247	236	151	162	243	375	296	469
200: II. Economic Infrastructure & Services	85	67	32	45	21	74	27	178
300: III. Production Sectors	80	72	49	56	54	122	69	106
400: IV. Multi-Sector / Cross-Cutting	82	35	38	61	49	53	48	79
500: VI. Commodity Aid / General Programme Assistance	15	21	11	23	17	20	34	26
600: VII. Action Relating to Debt	245	668	6	33	24	81	145	201
700: VIII. Humanitarian Aid	64	65	80	57	63	111	172	260
910: Administrative Costs of Donors	34	45	31	31	34	36	21	38
930: Refugees in Donor Countries	3	439	220	345	712	988	1,665	1,763
998: IX. Unallocated / Unspecified	15	16	24	26	22	31	14	15
1000: Total All Sectors	870	1,664	641	840	1,236	1,891	2,492	3,136
Total ODA - In Donor Refugee Costs (Sector: 600)	867	1,224	421	495	525	903	826	1,372
General Government Final Consumption Expenditures	433,945	426,059	420,185	418,891	415,898	413,561	414,815	414,492
Total ODA/GGFCE	0.20%	0.39%	0.15%	0.20%	0.30%	0.46%	0.60%	0.76%
(Total ODA - IDRC)/GGFCE	0.20%	0.29%	0.10%	0.12%	0.13%	0.22%	0.20%	0.33%
gr_(Total ODA/GGFCE)	-3.28%	94.64%	-60.91%	31.34%	48.31%	53.79%	31.38%	25.96%
gr_(Total ODA - IDRC/GGFCE)	-3.63%	43.76%	-65.15%	17.92%	6.85%	73.06%	-8.79%	66.22%

Source: Refugees and Asylum Seekers: UNHCR Population Statistics
ODA: OECD DAC CRS DATA (Constant 2016 US $, Millions),
General Government Final Consumption Expenditure: WDI (Constant 2010 US $, Millions)

G. Asylum Seekers, Refugees, ODA, and GGFCE Figures for the UK

	UK							
Year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Asylum seekers (Annual Flow)	13,521	19,439	25,948	19,440	22,113	38,123	25,872	16,027
Refugee (Stock)	238,150	193,510	149,799	126,055	117,234	123,067	118,995	121,766
100: I. Social Infrastructure & Services	3,518	3,896	4,045	4,922	4,598	4,388	5,072	4,802
200: II. Economic Infrastructure & Services	652	836	837	847	866	1,236	1,150	1,023
300: III. Production Sectors	515	431	425	470	599	779	717	951
400: IV. Multi-Sector / Cross-Cutting	1,387	884	1,023	1,382	1,344	1,402	1,567	1,520
500: VI. Commodity Aid / General Programme Assistance	784	544	409	322	106	101	129	54
600: VII. Action Relating to Debt	176	165	102	75	4		3	4
700: VIII. Humanitarian Aid	548	617	611	1,161	1,547	1,750	1,754	1,862
910: Administrative Costs of Donors	353	417	478	332	360	551	634	721
930: Refugees in Donor Countries	17	28	41	45	186	347	553	500
998: IX. Unallocated / Unspecified	93	149	31	278	330	122	90	335
1000: Total All Sectors	8,043	7,967	8,001	9,835	9,941	10,676	11,669	11,771
Total ODA - In Donor Refugee Costs (Sector: 600)	8,025	7,938	7,961	9,790	9,754	10,329	11,115	11,271
General Government Final Consumption Expenditures	521,146	521,716	528,194	527,242	538,888	546,480	550,596	549,538
Total ODA/GGFCE	1.54%	1.53%	1.51%	1.87%	1.84%	1.95%	2.12%	2.14%
(Total ODA - IDRC)/GGFCE	1.54%	1.52%	1.51%	1.86%	1.81%	1.89%	2.02%	2.05%
gr_(Total ODA/GGFCE)	7.54%	-1.05%	-0.80%	23.14%	-1.11%	5.90%	8.48%	1.07%
gr_(Total ODA - IDRC/GGFCE)	7.47%	-1.19%	-0.95%	23.20%	-2.51%	4.42%	6.81%	1.59%

Source: Refugees and Asylum Seekers: UNHCR Population Statistics
ODA: OECD DAC CRS DATA (Constant 2016 US $, Millions),
General Government Final Consumption Expenditure: WDI (Constant 2010 US $, Millions)

H. Omitted Observations from the three scatterplots (years 2011-2017)

gr_idrc & gr_total (18/172 obs)

country	year	as	ref	gr_idrc	gr_total
Australia	2012	15,996	6,649	826880%	4%
Austria	2015	85,617	11,469	365%	-24%
Finland	2016	5,319	5,698	225%	-27%
Germany	2015	441,899	99,142	1907%	4%
Greece	2013	8,225	1,385	13%	-73%
Greece	2015	11,365	14,534	232%	-40%
Hungary	2015	174,430	1,526	8%	123%
Iceland	2014	160	20	641%	-12%
Ireland	2017	2,380	593	3474%	-1%
Italy	2011	40,356	1,663	14391%	44%
Italy	2012	17,352	6,719	-49%	-65%
Italy	2015	83,243	24,332	40%	73%
Luxembourg	2013	988	2,798	881%	-1%
Portugal	2015	896	290	252%	-24%
Slovenia	2015	262	35	10333%	3%
Spain	2016	16,274	6,532	172%	278%
Spain	2017	30,766	4,537	134%	-70%
UK	2014	22,113	-8,821	301%	-3%

gr_idrc & gr_total in relation to ref (36/172 obs)

country	year	as	ref	gr_idrc	gr_total
Australia	2012	15,996	6,649	826880%	4%
Austria	2015	85,617	11,469	365%	-24%
Austria	2017	21,546	21,947	-76%	8%
Canada	2014	13,454	-11,186	7%	-3%
Canada	2015	16,067	-13,275	13%	4%
Canada	2016	23,833	-38,556	85%	-17%
Finland	2016	5,319	5,698	225%	-27%
Germany	2011	45,741	-22,585	-1%	1%
Germany	2013	109,580	-402,170	71%	4%
Germany	2015	441,899	99,142	1907%	4%
Germany	2016	722,364	353,367	108%	12%
Germany	2017	180,863	300,820	-13%	4%
Greece	2013	8,225	1,385	13%	-73%
Greece	2015	11,365	14,534	232%	-40%
Greece	2016	49,784	21,589	152%	3%
Greece	2017	56,835	-7,479	-54%	30%
Hungary	2015	174,430	1,526	8%	123%
Iceland	2014	160	20	641%	-12%
Ireland	2017	2,380	593	3474%	-1%
Italy	2011	40,356	1,663	14391%	44%
Italy	2012	17,352	6,719	-49%	-65%
Italy	2014	63,657	17,451	108%	7%
Italy	2015	83,243	24,332	40%	73%
Italy	2017	126,376	19,890	6%	66%
Luxembourg	2013	988	2,798	881%	-1%
Luxembourg	2014	973	7,787	-100%	-3%
Slovenia	2015	262	35	10333%	3%
Spain	2016	16,274	6,532	172%	278%
Spain	2017	30,766	4,537	134%	-70%
Sweden	2015	156,459	27,313	157%	-11%
Sweden	2016	22,411	60,644	-67%	6%
Switzerland	2017	16,027	10,314	-53%	-7%
UK	2011	19,439	-44,640	63%	-1%
UK	2012	25,948	-43,711	41%	-1%
UK	2013	19,440	-23,744	12%	23%
UK	2014	22,113	-8,821	301%	-3%

gr_idrc & gr_total in relation to as (31/172 obs)

country	year	as	ref	gr_idrc	gr_total
Australia	2012	15,996	6,649	826880%	4%
Austria	2015	85,617	11,469	365%	-24%
France	2013	60,461	14,622	-15%	-17%
France	2017	91,705	32,597	28%	11%
Germany	2013	109,580	-402,170	71%	4%
Germany	2014	173,072	29,406	20%	22%
Germany	2015	441,899	99,142	1907%	4%
Germany	2016	722,364	353,367	108%	12%
Germany	2017	180,863	300,820	-13%	4%
Greece	2013	8,225	1,385	13%	-73%
Greece	2017	56,835	-7,479	-54%	30%
Hungary	2015	174,430	1,526	8%	123%
Iceland	2014	160	20	641%	-12%
Ireland	2017	2,380	593	3474%	-1%
Italy	2011	40,356	1,663	14391%	44%
Italy	2012	17,352	6,719	-49%	-65%
Italy	2015	83,243	24,332	40%	73%
Italy	2016	122,124	29,323	68%	-9%
Italy	2017	126,376	19,890	6%	66%
Japan	2013	3,252	3	2%	63%
Luxembourg	2013	988	2,798	881%	-1%
Poland	2016	9,388	341	-36%	49%
Slovak Republic	2016	100	170	-10%	54%
Slovenia	2015	262	35	10333%	3%
Spain	2016	16,274	6,532	172%	278%
Spain	2017	30,766	4,537	134%	-70%
Sweden	2015	156,459	27,313	157%	-11%
UK	2014	22,113	-8,821	301%	-3%
USA	2015	90,579	5,980	5%	-6%
USA	2016	124,251	-243	35%	2%
USA	2017	137,697	14,106	-25%	5%

Source:

Refugees and Asylum Seekers: UNHCR Population Statistics

ODA: OECD DAC CRS DATA (Constant 2016 US $, Millions),

General Government Final Consumption Expenditure: WDI (Constant 2010 US $, Millions)

난민과 공적개발원조 (ODA)

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주제어: 공적개발원조 (ODA), 난민, 비호신청자, in-donor refugee costs